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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 August 1949

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet-Yugoslav Relations

While recent notes to Belgrade have fully revealed the Kremlin's overt hostility toward Tito, it is not believed that the USSR plans at this time to resort to armed intervention in Yugoslavia. Despite unconfirmed reports of Soviet troop movements within the Satellites adjacent to Yugoslavia, the logistical build-up in those countries is totally inadequate to support any extensive operation against Tito. The present avowed hostility of the Kremlin towards the Tito regime will probably be limited to an intensification of the "war of nerves" between the Kremlin and Belgrade.

In addition to long-range Soviet desires to liquidate the present Yugoslav leaders, current Soviet charges are probably intended to:

1. Parry Yugoslav charges of Moscow betrayal of Yugoslav claims on Austria and the guerrilla movement in Greece,

2. Forestall, through intimidation, possible Yugoslav moves in Albania,

3. Impede Yugoslav rapprochement with the West, and

4. Counter Tito's recent claims to leadership in the Balkans.

The USSR probably hopes to achieve a revolution by generating tension and confusion within Yugoslavia. The Kremlin may estimate that increased subversive and sabotage activities, in conjunction with Yugoslavia's economic problems, might induce COMINFORM sympathizers to overthrow the Tito government.

It is doubted, however, that the Soviets will be successful in their endeavor in the immediate future. Moreover, the present Kremlin effort could result in a strengthening of Tito's position, both internally and in his Western negotiations.

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Director of Central
Intelligence

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